华晨宝马新工厂投资由5.6亿增至10亿欧元

华晨宝马新工厂投资由5.6亿增至10亿欧元 2011年05月20日 16:03 新华网5月19日，华晨宝马第25万辆下线。 从2003年7月第一辆国产BMW下线，到2007年初累计生产5万辆汽车，公司迅速度过初创时期。得益于长期不懈提升产能的努力，从2008年10月突破10万辆到今天迎来第25万辆下线仅用了两年半的时间。 华晨宝马总裁兼首席执行官康思远说：“让我们自豪的不仅是产量的提升，更是质量的保证。这25万辆在中国生产的BMW汽车全部拥有与宝马集团全世界任何工厂的产品相媲美的高品质。”2009年和2010年，华晨宝马生产的BMW 5系连续获得了J.D.Power新车质量大奖。 2010年8月推出的全新BMW 5系长轴距在很短时间内即获得巨大成功。从去年10月开始月销量一直保持在5,000辆以上，市场份额增加10%之多，成为中国市场上最受欢迎的高档商务轿车，改变了这一细分市场的竞争格局。 近日，宝马集团宣布进一步加强对中国市场的战略承诺，对新工厂的投资由起始阶段计划的5.6亿欧元增至10亿欧元，加快冲压车间、新涂装车间和新工厂周边基础设施的建设，使新工厂尽早具备年产20万辆的产能。位于大东区的宝马工厂也将争取达到年产约10万辆的规模。 这意味着，华晨宝马汽车有限公司将在中期拥有总共30万辆的总产能。 位于沈阳铁西经济技术开发区的新工厂正在全速建设之中，计划2012年初开始投产。新工厂建成之后，将是全球最现代、最灵活、最具可持续性的工厂之一。这里会有新的BMW车型投产，包括BMW X1。新工厂的投入使用将创造4,000多个新的工作岗位。

高盛不滿信置表現

當中，高盛不滿信置表現，將其剔出確信買入名單，但投資評級仍為「買入」，目標價則由21.5元下調至21.4元。該行指出，自去年11月中，將信置納入確信買入名單後，股價累跌21.8%，相比MSCI香港指數下跌2.6%，顯見股價不濟。該行認為，股價表現不理想，主要是因為信置過去六個月，未如預期推出新項目，以及憂慮加息，看來信置管理層都要加把勁。

Sale Vol. of 1114.HK, First 4 months in China

Sales is still strong despite the slowdown of automobile market in China.

100K sales target is very likely achievable but the current price may has already reflected.

Value Investing - Making it successful in China

Thank you very much, Professor. Professor Bruce Greenwald, I appreciate the opportunity to speak today. I want to say thank you again to the Heilbrunn Center for Graham & Dodd Investing and Columbia Business School, and of course I am deeply grateful to all of you for coming. I will try my best to share with you what I know about how to apply the value investing discipline in my part of the world, East and Southeast Asia. Now, before I go on, I need to tell you, according to Compliance regulations, that the statements that I am about to make to you represent my personal opinions and not those of Value Partners. As for Value Partners, we are the only listed asset management company in Asia, outside Japan, and even in Japan there is only one listed company, so there is ample documentation available on who we are and what we do; there is a lot of transparency. The company was listed in 2007 by Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan. The mission of the company is very straightforward. Our mission is to build a temple of value investing for East and Southeast Asia. This phrase was coined by yours truly. Actually, I used to be a journalist; I worked for The Wall Street Journal in the 1980s. But seriously, what we are really trying to say with this phrase is that we are first and foremost a value investor, and only secondly are we a China investor. The distinction is quite important, because up to now, China has been what I call a ‘story’ market. A lot of people buy and sell China based on stories they read in the press or on what somebody has told them about. In the process, it can be very difficult to carry out fundamental value investing according to the textbook definition. So, we are trying to go the other way. Our standard textbook throughout the 1990s was Graham & Dodd’s Security Analysis. We actually applied it quite religiously; we used to call it the Bible. But in more recent years we switched to a different book. I am not plugging the book, just telling you what we do. It is a book by a guy named Martin Fridson, whom I never met, called Financial Statement Analysis. It is a simpler book, but pretty much the same thing as Security Analysis. We’ve conducted about 2500 company visits per year, excluding phone calls. That is the real source of our power; just old fashioned kicking the tires. So, we do a lot of financial modeling. We’ve conducted about 2500 company visits per year, excluding phone calls. That is the real source of our power; just old fashioned kicking the tires. What we are good at is that we put into practice the theory of value investing that my colleagues and I have read about and we’ve study very seriously. I actually do not believe we have anything original to say about the theory, but I think we have gained some valuable insights that I will share with you about its actual application; this is what we are actually good at. Now, before I go on to the next slide, I want to tell you that by the roughly mid-to-late 1990s, I was coming up against the big “what if” question, as I tried to create a sustainable business model out of the concept that I wanted to carry out value investing in this very immature market that we call China. Because I began to ask myself what if we can create a business model – a value investing firm – that performs, but that is not dependent on having a genius or a star performer or some kind of a magical black box within the firm? I even began to wonder if there was some kind of a conspiracy, maybe by the marketing people or the press, to try to tell the story that to beat the market you needed to have a genius or a star performer or a black box, and I thought to myself that this was not a very sustainable way of doing the job. So, I began to ask myself very straightforward questions like, is there a way that normal people, ordinary people that you recruit out of college, can become very good value investors, at least with respect to the China region? So, that became a kind of quest for me. Initially, it was just intellectual, but as I am going to explain to you over the next 15 minutes, we turned it into a reality. First of all, you have got to understand that if you do not have good people you cannot create a good product. So, the first answer to the puzzle or the question I just raised is to create a very good corporate culture. And the second thing we do, which is, I think, a bit more interesting, although I know that sometimes when I say this, I am greeted with a bit of hostility from people who do not want to hear about this. I believe I have succeeded, to some extent anyway, in industrializing the value investing process, transforming it from a boutique craft into a process of mass manufacture. It sounds pretty elaborate, but actually is very simple. Again, I will explain to you, but I am trying to get away from a system that relies on geniuses, and trying to get a system that I turned into a sustainable and a scalable process. In fact, we have been doing this in Hong Kong since the late 1990s – sometimes with great difficulty. Sometimes, we thought better to just give up, but we stuck to it and we have in the process created, what I think, is a pretty valuable business that in fact has consistently been able to beat the market. I believe I have succeeded, to some extent anyway, in industrializing the value investing process, transforming it from a boutique craft into a process of mass manufacture. It sounds pretty elaborate, but actually is very simple. of Merrill Lynch. That was the first mainland China company. Today, of course, it is the partner of BMW in China. Things happened at Value Partners too quickly; there was not enough time to put together an in-depth and appropriate culture of professional integrity. That is why you sometimes hear some great horror stories. Very basic concepts that should have been instilled in the market when people first joined, concepts like put a client’s interests first, be transparent in your dealings, identify and be wary of potential conflicts of interest… You would be amazed by how many people in my industry, in my part of the world, have never heard about it or only pay lip service to it. So the first thing I did was – actually not the first, but sometime in the mid-to-late 1990s – I pu t together what I call My Promise, and I asked my staff to sign it, individually. I framed it and put it in front of them, in front of their computer, so they would be reminded of it every day. And we do a lot of this brainwashing thing, you know, that we have elaborate ceremonies and kind of assure one another that we are very serious about our Promise. So, here is a copy of the promise and it basically just encapsulates basic concepts that you need, because value investing is really a kind of a very vigorous philosophy and deep exploration of reality, but if you don’t have people who are intellectually even honest, there is no way you can carry out the mission. The first part of what we do is that we had to start from almost ground zero in terms of creating an appropriate culture to implement and execute this concept. Here, I have to take two steps backwards and explain to you the context in which I operate, because here I am in a market that, unlike in the United States, is a very young and immature market. The first companies from Mainland China were only listed in 1991 or 1990, I cannot remember; there is a company called Brilliance China, and it was listed in New York with the help mass manufacturing and industrializing a craft, what I really meant was that I have broken it down into a set of skills. Each skill can be mastered by fairly ordinary people with probably just a college education, and the process is teachable, is repeatable, is sustainable, and is scalable. It is definitely not magic, it is definitely not driven by genius, but it is all the above that I mentioned to you. I would identify each of these skills to you, but the starting point for this is that there are a number of images I can draw for you to try to communicate what I am actually trying to achieve. One is, I was very frustrated by the idea that no matter how smart a human being is – even the President of the US, for example, who is after all just a human being – his potential for excellence i s almost defined by the limitations of being human. But what I really want, if possible, is an operation or situation that can be almost beyond human – superhuman – and then I thought of the concept of the ant colony. There is a saying that in case of an all-out nuclear war, the human beings won’t survive but the ants will. Why is that? Each ant is probably a pretty dumb animal or insect, but together, by socializing the process involved in survival and production, they are incredibly strong. You can’t really kill them all, they are repeatable, they are scalable, etcetera. Each human being has different strengths and weaknesses, but together we make a formidable team. Finally, I thought about what Chairman Mao said, or was alleged to have said. I was too young actually, but there was something about using socialism to help capitalism. So, as a company, we are a pretty socialist company. I won’t go into big detail, but people have compared us to being Israelis on a Kibbutz – everyone helps each other, but we are actually doing all this in cause of the capitalist system actually. Anyway, so what we are really doing is that we have broken down each skill into steps and here are the steps, these are the so-called seven specialist skills. The first skill, obviously, is originating ideas. Original ideas itself is an important skill. We have a matrix, let us call each of it A, B, C, D. I’m quite proud to tell you that I actually scored A in originating ideas, but unfortunately, in some other skills I have like a C. Each human being has different strengths and weaknesses, but together we make a formidable team, I think. So, for originating ideas for a value investor in China and Hong Kong, the key is to find ideas that are very contrarian. Perhaps I should illustrate it on the board. I will go through each skill step by step and tell you or highlight the salient points that we use to train people for each skill. For originating ideas skills, which I claim to score an A, we have a universe of several thousand stocks: Taiwan, Mainland China, Hong Kong, and in the case of Value Partners, some Korea, Japan and Southeast Asia. We simply divide all the stocks into category 1, 2 and 3. One is undervalued, so your job if you work for me or in my team is that you must try to identify Category 1 stocks and then do research on it. Category 1 stocks are undervalued. Category 2 is fair value. We find a lot of sell-side brokers tend to recommend Category 2 stocks. And, when you sit in a taxi and the taxi driver tells you about stocks, it is probably Category 3. So, technically, our objective is to buy 1 and sell at Category 2.5. Later I will start telling about the problems, but anyway, right now I am just giving you the theory. For Category 1, generally, the most fertile area to find these ideas are stocks that are unpopular that nobody cares about – definitely not an index stock, or that something bad has happened. It sounds so simple, but in real life it is quite difficult to do because maybe it is Asian culture or human nature, but people do not feel safe sticking their necks out to look at these unpopular companies. So, in China-related stock markets, there are actually quite a lot of Category 1 stocks because it is a very emotional market, very momentum driven, so stocks fall in and they fall out of favor fairly quickly, and, in fact, in a rather predictable way. Now, in case you can identify good Category 1 stocks, your next step is to start looking at the research part of it. Remember, I said this was skill number 2. Research, now for a firm like Value Partners, and I think a number of firms around the world, is quite difficult to push out to the frontier intellectually. We have standardized our spreadsheet, and we look at all the obvious details and financial numbers and number crunching. The only thing new I can say about research is that in the China context, we have been moving increasingly away from quantitative analysis to qualitative analysis. When I first started in the 1990s, there were very few companies with superior business characteristics in China. What you were really buying were pretty lousy companies trading at very cheap prices, and that, in fact, it was quite difficult to be a long-term investor because some of these companies got chopped up, or competitors came in and they are gone. So, we were pretty much a traditional classic value investors trying to get the last free puff of the cigarette. But in more recent years, the trend has been much more encouraging. You are finding more companies that may fit the description of a good franchise. I.e. a sustainable, competitive advantage, durable advantage we call it, and to do that it is very difficult to quantify in numbers. So, in China-related stock markets, there are actually quite a lot of Category 1 stocks because it is a very emotional market, very momentum driven, so stocks fall in and they fall out of favor fairly quickly. You have to look at the characteristics of the management and the business model. But in summary, we are looking for something called the three R’s: the Right Business, run by the Right People at the Right Price. And as I mentioned earlier, we are seeing a trend where the original emphasis of Value Partners on just the Right Price, because it was the only thing we haven’t found, is changing more and more to the Right Business run by the Right People. The third skill was originally not considered a skill until I began to realize that decision making is in fact a teachable skill in itself. Actually, the real problem is the lack of decision making, because although we had a team of almost 30 people who were analysts and fund managers, few people actually wanted to stick their neck out and make a real decision. We call that a lack of killer instinct – this is one of my phrases. Nobody really wants to kill anybody anymore in our civilized world, you know. So, we even have a guy who has since left the company, we called Mr. OTOH. OTOH stands for ‘On The Other Hand’. Yeah, I’m sure all of us know about this, that the analyst will always give analysis in about 30 pages that take you half the night to read, and the conclusion is: however, if, but, and on the other hand, you know. So, in the end, you don’t know what you are supposed to do, if anything. So, I am trying to kill the Mr. OTOHs in my company, but it is not easy, and I began to realize that it is possible to train and be good in decision-making. One clue to the way we are doing it is borrowed from the Buddhist philosophy, which I am a follower. It is to remove yourself, your sense of self from the equation, when you are trying to analyze anything. By injecting yourself or your sense of ‘me’ into an analysis, you distort the reality because your ego gets involved. Your perceived self-interest, your need to be given credit for something, gets involved. So, remove yourself from the analysis. Now, the next cue, we call it “deal structuring.” This again came about almost by accident, because I began to realize that by local Hong Kong standards, we are a very big company. But anyway, we are a big guy in our little patch of the jungle, and we can demand good treatment from the brokers, and I began to realize that if we decide to buy something based on the research and our idea finding, we shouldn’t just go and try to buy in the stock market. We should approach the company and say, let’s make a deal: we’ll buy 5% in your company, and you do it through a form of placement of a single block of shares or what the American people call “PIPES” transactions, which I think stands for privately something, something per equity, whatever, you know. You always get better terms, more discount, or you can get them as convertible bonds. For your information, about slightly over a year ago, an American company called Affiliated Managers Group, listed in New York City – the chairman is over there. They bought 5% of my company through a negotiated deal. All right, so due structuring in itself just brings a lot of benefits to clients. Now, the next skill I think we’ll mention is Execution. This is no longer done by our fund management team. It is actually done by a specialized team of full-time dealers; we have three of them in the office. It is in itself a specialized task. Then, from here on my scores are dropping, for your information. I tend to get high scores here and lower scores as we go along because I get bored as we go down the sausage-making machine. Maintenance – this is just a fancy word for saying, “after you buy the stock, don’t forget about it.” Keep in touch with the company, update your research vigorously, and keep thinking how you can continue to enhance the value of the investment. And the final thing is Exit. For people like me, Maintenance and Exits are weak points, and I tend to try to delegate it to other members of my team who are more interested in these particular skills. Exit means actually selling the stocks, and the prevailing wisdom for this is that you are supposed to exit when you figure that what you know about the company and the people in the company is quite common knowledge to everybody, so you have no more value to add to the investing process. Then you should be getting out; in theory. In real life, we usually sell far too early. I think it is a thing about value investors. We see a lot of problems all the time. I think it is a thing about value investors. We see a lot of problems all the time. All right, sorry, just a short intermission. In case you are the CIO, you have to master these additional skills that I had not mentioned earlier. The additional skills are: providing leadership, to make things happen – macro strategy – which we didn’t use to think about as a skill, because we were diehard, bottom-up value investors, until the Asian financial crisis. And then we realized that you actually better have some idea of what is the overall macro environment you are operating in; asset allocation and portfolio construction. This is not done at the fund’s managerial level; it is done at my level. I am actually the Co-CIO with another guy named Mr. Louis So. We two guys are responsible for these skills, for better or for worse. We try to provide leadership to the team, motivating people. Here, the key take-away you should note is that there is an abundance of hard skills in Asia, but a shortage of soft skills. What do I mean by that? For your typical Asian people, if you can sit an examination and provide some text books, they would do very well; they have that kind of culture. But if you ask them to do things that are not so tangible like communicating with people, motivating people, providing leadership and leading, they are not so good. I am not sure why that is so, but it is a fact. So, we tend to struggle a little bit in finding people who are willing to be leaders or to even communicate properly with people in the office leadership. Macro strategy, I am not a macro expert, but because of my perhaps size and experience, I am plugged to people who are macro experts, and I make sure they give me the first call if they think anything is worth talking about. That is probably good enough, but you have to have some sense of the environment where you are trying to put money to work, although we remain primarily a bottom-up stock picking company, and asset allocation and portfolio construction must take into account your evaluation of the macro environment. So, more or less as an example, we went from 10% cash in our funds to 1% cash in our funds between June and July this year, because, from a macro point of view, we concluded this is one of those windows that opened up for China investing where you should be very aggressive when putting money to work. The right way to go to do our job is that if you enter a transaction if you are a buyer, you shouldn’t be buying if you think the seller knows more than you. Negative interest rates, soft landing, now increasingly evident for the China economy, and various other factors, including inflation, are likely to increase a harder landing because the Hong Kong dollar and the US dollar are pegged, so we are importing a lot of loose money policies from the US, even though our own economy is actually doing very well. So, the adjustment is taking place through asset prices. I want to share with you at this point, the halfway mark of my prepared remarks, that internally we no longer call ourselves ‘value investors’, although of course we are, you know, otherwise I don’t think I will be invited to speak to you today. But internally, we use another phrase now. I won’t write it because it’s easy to remember. We call ourselves ‘advantage investors’, which is part and parcel of the seven skills approach I mentioned to you. I have developed and written quite a number of memos internally on the concept that the right way to go to do our job is that if you enter a transaction if you are a buyer, you shouldn’t be buying if you think the seller knows more than you. If you are a seller, you shouldn’t be selling if you have not clarified why the buyers are willing to buy from you. This is a simple advantage idea; that you must always have some confidence that you have an advantage over the counter party in any transaction, and we have developed many theories about advantage, most of it is based on the idea of having more research. Here we are blessed, because unlike a relatively more efficient market like the US, our markets are extremely inefficient. We have all sorts of people who are not qualified to be in the stock market but who insist on being in it anyway. I had many experiences where I asked people, “what is the purpose of the stock market my dear?” And they are, “Oh! It’s there for you to make money.” That is all they will say. They forget that the market is there to mobilize surplus savings of a society and put it to work in productive enterprises. Nobody cares about that actually; asset-wise, maybe. But anyway, so if you take the trouble to research and do company visits, you have actually a pretty strong advantage over many other players in China-related stock markets who are actually quite, you will say, ‘uneducated’ in the true sense of the word. You definitely can practice advantage investing. Portfolio construction at my level is mostly based on the idea of taking advantage of the macro environment and highlighting your core competence. Actually, we only have one real core competence: stock picking. So, the portfolios that I run are all designed to – as Professor Greenwald mentioned earlier – to gather against the downside risks, while participating in the upside through a construction system that basically allows us to shine in the one thing we know best: picking stocks. This process allowed us to grow our fund size in a way that couldn’t be done if our business model was based on a single human being, a certified genius running the fund. I am going to go on because it is time to talk about overall things I learned about how to survive and prosper in China-related markets. Here, I am leaving one of my main subjects, which is how I think we are trying to industrialize the process of investing, but before I go away from the subject, I want to emphasize again that when I tried to describe this process to some clients, I noticed that they were not very happy, because they thought this is a some sort of a trick for us to become an asset gatherer, that the reason we have this industrialized process was because we want to get big. This process allowed us to grow our fund size in a way that couldn’t be done if our business model was based on a single human being, a certified genius running the fund. But here we can have many, many people are doing it, right? But I just want to assure you this is really not true. The truth is, from the 1990s onwards, I was very interested in knowing how we can develop a sustainable business model for running money, and yet beat the market consistently, and yet depend on hiring normal people to join our company. Not great people, but just normal people who can, however, become great, and also a system that we help each other with our weaknesses, in a very humble and frank manner. Okay, let us talk about Asia as a whole. First of all, I already mentioned it is basically a very inefficient market. You don’t necessarily make money by investing in superior businesses. As I said, there is a growing number of such superior businesses, but it is still much less than in America. You make money by taking money from stupid people who shouldn’t be in the market; that is the truth about it – it’s changing but it’s stil l there. You need to be familiar with the political and social context of the investment, not just the financials. We have problems sometimes with Asian people who came out of US Universities with an MBA or whatever, because we find that they are too focused on numbers alone. Actually, there is enormous baggage in Asia regarding its history. Some people are very sensitive about politics and social issues. You have to be sympathetic to it. You have to understand why sometimes so-called irrational things are done. I think even the Chinese Government, from my feedback now, is beginning to realize that growth for the sake of growth is not that ideal. There are a lot of other things that are important, like having a clean environment, reducing the income gap between the rich and poor, countryside and cities, and not just growth for the sake of growth, and this is in the same context that you must understand what makes people do what they do. Because of their history, their social values, etc. One exercise we try to do sometimes with some success is, we imagine what the newspaper will say about the company we are investing in, six months from today, 12 months from today, 36 months from today. I think it is probably because of my own background as a newspaperman. It is very useful when you look that way; that you can imagine, close your eyes and imagine, because you will find that sometimes the outcome for your particular company, whether it is a car company or an agricultural company, is driven not just by numbers, but by government policies and sometimes even by, let us say, the phenomenon called El Nino, which is a kind of a temperature, climate thing that is sweeping the Pacific right now. Now, the last one I will say again is something that I noticed. Sometimes, people don’t want to hear from me but I have got a secret that I will share with you. When I first started my job with Value Partners in 1993, I was like every other US- trained or US-inference fund manager. I believed in having a very concentrated portfolio. I used to go around telling everybody “you won’t see more than 40 companies in my fund, these are my high conviction ideas,” and I was very proud of it; and then as the years went by, I began to realize that our market was really very different from the US, because there are just a lot of crooks out there with very bad corporate governance, and some of these guys are very convincing. I used to go around telling everybody “you won’t see more than 40 companies in my fund, these are my high conviction ideas,” and I was very proud of it. So, your high conviction idea may turn out to be actually your next lament, you know. But you won’t know until you wake up the next morning and read about it in the newspaper that your investment, which makes up 5% of your concentrated fund, has just evaporated overnight. It happened to me quite a number of times, so I have many scars with me. So, in the last, especially 10 years, I’ve swung to a different view. For emerging markets such as China, it is better to have a very diversified portfolio. Don’t put more than say 1 to 2% of your fund in any particular idea, because you can then go to sleep much better and you can withstand all these nasty accidents that seem to happen every now and then, no matter how hard you work at it. So, now we have a portfolio with typically over 80 to 110 companies inside. Now, why don’t more fund managers do what I say; it’s because there is a lot of self-interest. Few fund managers don’t have the kind of research resources that I do . If you have a research team of maybe 5 people, it is already quite a feat to have a fund with maybe 40 ideas inside; but we have the resources. We have 100 companies and we still have the resources to come up with 100 top-notch ideas; and that is what we are doing. Keep it diversified, be able to withstand the unexpected bad guy who smiles at you, shakes hands with you, and then disappears with all your money very suddenly, you know. As professor Greenwald was saying, it got the downside risks, you see, not the variation. Keep it diversified. Now, the next phenomenon I want to tell you about is that our industry over there is surrounded by pirates; not Somali pirates. By this, I mean stock promoters whose full-time specialty is giving you very convincing presentations and getting you to put money into their projects or companies. I am very familiar with this phenomenon. I have lost some money to these guys, too. It partly has to do with what I mentioned earlier, the fact that it is a young market and it takes time for the proper values and professional integrity to develop. So, you have all these well-dressed young men and women who specialize in talking to fund managers like me. They know that we control a lot of money, and unlike banks we do not really have credit evaluation, we just decide. Sometimes, within the same day, we can give you tens of millions of dollars of other people’s money to finance your project if your presentation sounds right. So these days, if someone comes to see me who has got the right university degrees and attire and speaks like my kind of language and tells what I want to hear, I am actually very suspicious. I’m not relaxed at all. I now have a history of preferring people who are pretty rough and ready, and look like they just came out of the shop floor. That is my kind of person now. I mentioned earlier about abundant hard skills, not much soft skills, and here is the other thing about our industry. Because of the incredible growth and abundance of wealth created so suddenly in just 20 years by the financial industry in East and Southeast Asia, everybody wants to join in. Even people who are not the least bit interested in finance. This is very unhealthy. It has created a phenomenon that I call the money disease, where people join because they think they will make a lot of money not because they are interested in our profession. At Value Partners, we usually have an induction class that within the first 3 months, I will personally give you a talk where I try to explain to you that your name is your brand. If your name is John Smith, then John Smith is your brand. It stands for how people will see you in the years and the decades to come, and you can very easily spoil it by becoming a victim of the money disease, putting money in front of everything else, whereas money in fact should be a byproduct of professional excellence. If you are very good in what you do, money will find you, you don’t have to find money. It reminds me of Sash Spencer. Okay, I jumped the slide a little bit. So, your name is your brand. Now, the next thing we want to do is that we think that the disease of fund management is ego. People who have had some success being money managers, they are very vulnerable to the ego disease. They think they are God and we try to discourage that. For example, we have this Master Big Theory of how you see yourself. If you see yourself as smart, you are likely to do stupid things. If you see yourself as stupid, you are likely to do smart things. You can very easily spoil [your personal brand] by becoming a victim of the money disease, putting money in front of everything else, whereas money in fact should be a byproduct of professional excellence. So, we try to tell each other, let us see each other as stupid people. It is better to assume we are stupid. And we also find, at least for our team, people tend to overreact to almost everything. It is that kind of office: we are nervous, we are jumpy, there is a very high energy level. The average age in my office is about 30 to 35 years old, lots of surplus energy. So, I had to train people before you even decide what to do, decide how much you are willing to invest emotionally, and as a reaction, to any situation. Once you have decided it should be no reaction, some reaction or a lot of reaction, then decide the contents of your reaction; what exactly and how you want to react. And of course, be a contrarian, as always. I want to show you how all these years of fighting and being hurt and trying to be the best is possible. My own signature is “Learn.” I changed my signature when I was about 25 years old from my name to “Learn,” so that I can remind myself every day when I sign my name to be humble and learn new things, because I think the commitment of learning is one of the major characteristics of a civilized and responsible human being, whether you are a fund manager or you are not a fund manager. But if you are a fund manager, even more so. So, timing is good. I’m on track. I just want to end the formal presentations and invite your questions by summarizing some slogans you will see on the walls at Value Partners, my office in Hong Kong. We try to be small enough to be effective, big enough to be strong. This is probably the subject of another speech, but essentially, even though we have grown to up to 100 people, I have been trying the various concepts and theories to divide the theme into small boutiques, so that each person working in Value Partners would not have a big company disease. He or she is actually working for a small group of only 5 people, and they have to think like a boutique and perform like a boutique. I am still facing some difficulties in executing this concept… That’s for the next speech. Also, I think I told this earlier that we try to create a company where we depend on ordinary people and try to turn them into extraordinary performers. Because I think it is not sustainable for a business model to depend on the constant inflow of geniuses to join you, and even if they do, they may not stay for very long. Finally, I started these formal remarks or discussion by saying that I don’t have much to say about theory, but we have gained a lot of insights into the practice of value investing. In fact, I would end by saying that how you see yourself is very important, and very often I find that I am my own worst enemy. My own error rate is about one third – about one third of everything I do. With hindsight, I wish I had not done it, but it is done, it is too late. So, the way I see myself and the way my young people who are working with me see themselves is that we think of ourselves first and foremost as soldiers. You know, we don’t wear a uniform, we don’t carry a gun, but we act very much like real soldiers, very disciplined, very committed. We don’t have any breaks, and we know that we are engaged in a war that never stops, the war for performance, and these things are not very theoretical for us because we actually mean what we say. Thank you so much. Professor Bruce Greenwald: All right, we’ll go ahead and take questions. Can we turn the lights up a little so we can see the audience? I mean, I would be happy to take questions from the audience if there are ones out there, since – Ah. Yes. Speaker #1: Thank you very much. Thank you for your kind remarks. Two questions really. You mentioned that you are finally finding a fair amount of quality companies with enduring franchises in Asia. Right? Quality enduring franchises. Two-part question. When we look at the non-SOEs in China, the non-SOEs, how many do you think will be allowed flourish over a number of years? I mean, I see they are confiscating BYD’s land; there was an article in Bloomberg last week about a private auto company being forced to merge with an SOE for political reasons – that is part 1. Maybe an easier question is, since about 90% of the SOEs’ CEOs are appointed by the communist party, what is their principal objective? Is it really to maximize shareholder value or to promote the communist party’s agenda regarding China? Mr. Cheah Cheng Hye: Actually this is a fundamentally credible question, because the economic and political system of the People’s Republic of China is not capitalism in the American sense. It is a form of authoritarian state capitalism. So, your question reflects the reality of what this actually means. The SOEs are there to carry out the concept that the party remains in control, although at the working level we have a system of material incentives and backup forces to promote an efficient economy. Now, having said that, I am not allowed to show you for compliance reasons my performance, but I can tell you verbally without giving you numbers because of the restrictions, that we have flourished essentially by focusing on private chips. Private chips is the jargon used by the industry to describe non-state enterprises. From the 1990s onwards, I figured that these big gigantic state-owned enterprises were not my cup of tea. So, I went on my way to cultivate a small number of private entrepreneurs who were allowed to flourish, and we took big stakes in them. Some of them let me down; they are some of my worst losses, but those that you make money. You make 10 beggars, you make 20 beggars, and they are still your friends till this day. So, the whole Value Partners fund was in fact a kind of antimagnetic fund in the sense that the main game about China is the state-owned enterprises, but we went the other way. We focused on the small number non-state enterprises, and the answer to your question, by the way, is that forced mergers between private enterprises and state-owned enterprises, as far as I know, are not a major issue in China. It gets reported by the media like Bloomberg, partly because the Western media, of which I used to be a representative myself, is very ideological. They tend to pick on those stories and highlight it, but this is not the main landscape. This is only part of the landscape that interests a Western audience. Rest assured that most private enterprises in China are left to their own devices for better or for worse, but the real body is not a level playing field. If you are the private enterprise you don’t get access to bank lending, bank loans; you don’t get access to privileged locations, and you have to wait a lot longer for licenses and other things. So, the playing field is very unfair if you are not a state-owned enterprise. And the way to get around that is to be corrupt – yes! So, there is a saying that may be less true, I’m trying to figure out what are the right words to use… I’m not good at discounting, is that you have got to be friends with the government officials. But every now and then, the government officials turn against you and then they pick up your file and say, you did XYZ corrupting back in 1985. Sorry boys, you know, you’re in jail. See, it’s a very messy system. Yeah, a lot of heartbreaks. Professor Bruce Greenwald: Okay, yes, go ahead. Speaker #2: Professor Bruce Greenwald: Okay, for people who didn’t hear that question, the question was: as the fund has gotten bigger and has had almost of necessity to move into larger cap stocks, how has that changed the investment process? Mr. Cheah Cheng Hye: The investment process actually has not changed for us in response to size constraints or size considerations, I should say. It has changed in response to my intellectual frustration, with the notion that both in the Western world and the Eastern world, that successful, glamorous hedge funds depend on star managers or mysterious black boxes. I think I tried to describe how I tried to change it into a process of very ordinary manufacturing process, but the answer to your question is on several levels. First of all, I think at some point, firms of Value Partners will come out against the constraints of capacity. Yeah, I think that’s the right word, capacity, yeah. We, in fact, briefly closed our funds several times in the past because we ran out of ideas. The way I have tried to do the job is that I know that at some point I won’t be able to take on any more money. My self-interest is performance rather than size, because I earn performance fees, which are more important to me than the small annual fee I get for size, and I have responded. If you look at my website from last year with my strategic partner, the Ping An Insurance Company of China, I launched an ETF division: Exchange-Traded Fund division. Three or four years ago, almost by accident I read the CFA journal, a professor from New York, but it is kind of unfair, I forgot his name. He was writing about the concept of fundamental indexing. He took the S&P 500, he picked the 25 cheapest stocks in terms of fundamental value, at least the lowest PE, if I am not mistaken, and it worked, he outperformed. I had simply copied his idea. Okay, having succeeded with that, it was an astonishing example. I think I’ll blow my trumpet a little bit here, of a local Hong Kong Chinese firm being able to penetrate into a space dominated by 2 western multinationals; BlackRock and I think StateStreet. We are not supposed to get in there. We got in there only because we came out of a differentiated product. Now that we are successful, we are conceptually, and I will choose my words, because for regulatory reasons I cannot kind of say too much, but we are coming out with similar fundamental indexing products for other asset classes and markets across the Asian continent. This will be my avenue for growth in future because of the limitations of the actively managed star. Professor Bruce Greenwald: In the back. Speaker #3: How does your research effort cover small and medium-sized companies in Asia, which are not covered by the institutional research community? To give you an example, IDS, which Li & Fung acquired a couple of weeks ago; it didn’t have any institutional research coverage on it at all, yeah. And if you just looked at it, you know that Victor and William Fung would support the company, and as part of that, when you have got somebody reputable like the Fung Brothers behind the company, do you give it a higher valuation, if you will, in terms of an asset allocation? Professor Bruce Greenwald: Oh, oh, there are two questions. The first is, how do you go about doing research on companies if there is no published research on those companies, except I assume the financials are available, so that’s the first question. The second question is, how important is the reputation for integrity and the quality of the people back in the companies, and how far does that affect your decision on the amount of money you’ll allocate to funds? Mr. Cheah Cheng Hye: Thank you for these questions. We are – you are talking with the right guy at this time because we are the pioneers of small-cap research and also China B-share research. The lack of published research is a huge advantage. You don’t really want someone else competing with you and researching the company. You want to be the first ambulance on the scene, you know, so I estimate that in my universe there are approximately 1000 to 1300 companies with market capitalization below US$1 billion. I classify them as small cap stocks, and we have an army of people there researching them and confidently buying them, usually through structured deals; and these people are, frankly speaking, desperate. They don’t have a brand; they don’t have a major institutional investor as their shareholder, so we squeeze them. We usually ask, in one particular case I can still recall last year, we asked for the maximum discount of 19.9% to the quoted price in the stock market… And the guy said yes. Actually, I was astonished, but anyway I took it, you know. So anyway, so no research is a good idea because it means you are really, really in the promised land, what I call Category #1. Remember I told you about Category 1, 2, 3? Yeah. Now, the real trouble with some of these guys are actually value traps. You could be in Category 1 forever. You never make any money out of it, you know? It refuses to move down the conveyor belt to category 2.5, when you are supposed to sell it, right? So, after you get in, it is fairly useful to try to encourage the management to do more IR and talk to the media and come out with this and that. But, for your information, contrary to what some people in our audience may think today, in general, the accounting standards for Hong Kong listed companies is very high; it is world class. It is typically done by a Big-4 auditor. We actually have the head of E&Y here, he used to work in Hong Kong for many years. Anyhow, and the regulators are incredibly strict; they have a habit of jailing anyone who violates the securities regulations, so published accounts are not an issue, it is not some Mickey Mouse play at all. Your second question is about integrity issues. This one is a tough one for me, too. I have been in the market – I am now 56 years old. I was a newspaperman from the age of 17 to 36, and from then on I was in the financial industry as a head of research, and then a money manager, and to this day I get fooled. I was fooled as recently as just a year ago by this guy who ran a company called Peace Mark who, however, was anything but peaceful. He ran a chain of watch shops selling fancy European watches, and he disappeared after I had put in about Hong Kong $40 million into his company. We are still chasing him, and this guy is like the, I can’t remember the term now. I think it is something like the great grand wizard of the Freemason’s chapter of Hong Kong, a pillar of the community, the son of one of the most established colonial families, etcetera. So what do you do? That is why I told you, right? You have to be diversified, do a lot of background checks, and pray for the best.

勝利油管中標合約值14.6 億

勝利油氣管道（1080）披露，該公司及其附屬共在五次公開招標中投得標書，涉及供應總重量約15.08 萬噸油氣管道，合約總價預計約14.6 億元人民幣。管道項目包括：西氣東輸二線輪南至吐魯番；長慶油田至呼和浩特；阜新煤製天然氣項目；煙台港西港區至淄博管道及靖邊至西安輸氣管道。

The stock 1080.HK is repeatedly recommended by Yau Wing Han, The God of Earning Money.

第一季度交卷華晨汽車繼續領跑自主汽車品牌第一集團

第一季度交卷華晨汽車繼續領跑自主汽車品牌第一集團

　　在中國車市第一季度的成績單中，據中國乘用車信息聯席會（乘聯會）統計數據顯示，華晨汽車以3月同比增長11%，第一季度累計同比增長10%的成績，成為領跑國內自主品牌的一支中堅力量。

　　就在整體車市呈現低速增長的態勢之時，華晨汽車出色的成績單寄托著華晨汽車總裁祁玉民力圖使中華轎車品牌走出由弱變強的希望，華晨汽車“十二五”戰略也將得到更強有力的支撐。

　　在乘聯會的榜單中，華晨汽車在輕客上的表現最為突出，以3月份8461台的銷量、同比增長30%，一舉超越了衆多競爭對手。同時，在A級車市場，主力車型中華駿捷FRV表現也非常突出，以3個月累計銷售22211輛 （3月份銷售8367輛），同比增長15.8%，繼續領跑同級別細分市場。

　　雖然一季度的車市表現整體缺乏亮點，但華晨汽車仍然延續了較為強勁的走勢，優秀的產品是保障。對此，華晨汽車銷售公司總經理沈毅表示：“華晨汽車一貫堅持製造國民精品車，在研發、製造、服務等環節上始終以高標準嚴格要求，不斷超越我們現有的成績。”　　“十二五”期間，華晨將大力發展自主品牌，力爭在“十二五”末期達成整車產銷150萬輛/年、發動機產銷150萬台/年、銷售收入超過1600億元/年的目標，實現企業規模和效益的歷史性飛躍；同時，繼續以“不求最大，但求最強”為發展目標，打造自主品牌最強自主產業鏈。

道路需求命繫車市

道路需求命繫車市 公路股增長與汽車行業密切相關，目前內地汽車銷量雖然明顯放緩，不過當中亦出現一些逆市奇葩。受惠於自駕遊熱潮，SUV 在市場受到熱捧，帶動銷量上升，成為今年平平無奇的車市中一絲曙光。上月舉行的上海國際車展，內地品牌展出的全新SUV 車款多達11 部，可見該市場的競爭漸趨白熱化。雖然眾多品牌爭逐SUV 市場， 但始終市場龍頭東風（489） 及側重SUV 業務的長汽（2333），在這股熱潮中佔優。 內地汽車市場今年受刺激政策減退影響，4 月份整體銷量表現低迷，較今年3月跌逾15%，比去年同期跌0.25%，自2009 年2 月以來更首次出現負增長。不過，SUV 的銷量卻上升，單計4 月份，就比去年同期增長18.91%，累計1-4 月份，增長率更達到38.94%，成為逆市奇葩。從銷售數據反映，內地車主對SUV 的需求殷切。 SUV 車類銷量的急速增長，已吸引多家車廠「中途出家」，陸續推出首款SUV 應市。比亞迪（1211）上周就推出首款SUV 車型S6，更以不足9 萬元（人民幣．下同）的低價發售。吉利（175）及華晨（1114）的SUV 新車亦在展覽會上露面，預計今年正式推出市場。至於市場關注的行業龍頭長汽和東風， 今年都會有新SUV 車款，其中長汽更會在年內推出6款。 事實上，SUV 銷售收入已成為長汽的主要增長動力。公司去年SUV 銷售收入增123.2%，而SUV 銷售收入佔整體收入增加9 個百分點至43%。SUV受歡迎，亦令長汽去年多賺226%至30.4 億元，收入增79%至221.7 億元。 毛利率由2009 年的17.3%提高4.6 個百分點至21.9%。在內地平淡的車市，發展SUV 業務，已成為市場突破點。 看好長汽的同時，亦不要遺忘市場一哥東風。論銷售數量，東風去年以24.5 萬輛SUV 力壓長汽的13.6 萬輛成市場龍頭。不過，SUV 只是東風的第二大業務，不及長汽的比重高，即使銷量大增，對公司業績所帶來的正面影響，亦不及長汽。 從SUV 市場的場長，可以看到內地車市並非全面一片的悲觀。加上在觀光消費增長的帶動下，汽車需求仍旺盛。不過道路配套未完善，才窒礙了汽車銷量的增長。未來在國家加強道路建設及發展的情況下，汽車及公路行業的中期前景不必看淡。 辛思維

寶馬在華投資追加至10億歐元 規劃產能將超30萬輛

寶馬在華投資追加至10億歐元 規劃產能將超30萬輛 　　隨著中國市場為跨國汽車巨頭貢獻的利潤越來越豐厚，後者也越來越倚重中國。昨日寶馬集團對外宣佈，將加大對華新工廠的投資，至10億歐元。 　　 兩年前，寶馬集團和華晨汽車集團二期擴建項目正式簽約，為擴大沈陽工廠的建設，投資額5.6億歐元（合計50億元人民幣），包括將目前位於遼寧省沈陽市大東區的現有工廠，從年產3萬輛的產能擴充至7.5萬輛，最大產能提升至10萬輛。同時，包括在沈陽市鐵西區興建華晨寶馬第二工廠，初始產能為10萬輛，兩個工廠未來的最終產能為30萬輛。 　　 而昨日，寶馬集團將投資擴大到10億歐元，據寶馬（中國）相關負責人透露，從長遠看，視市場發展需求，包括現在的大東工廠和鐵西新工廠的潛在總產能可以超過30萬輛。 　　 據悉，新增投資由寶馬集團和華晨集團共同出資，而據華晨寶馬相關人士介紹，擴大投資用于建設衝壓車間、塗裝車間以及鐵西新工廠的基礎設施提升。 　　 根據規劃，位於鐵西區的新工廠明年建成後，將投產寶馬3系、加長5系和緊湊SUV車型X1。----> This is the model produced by 1114.HK. 　　 寶馬對於緩解市場上的供不應求十分急迫。早在20多天前的上海車展上，華晨寶馬總裁兼首席執行官康思遠在接受《第一財經日報》採訪時便表示，新工廠建設速度很快，在18個月內完成工程建設，這在寶馬的工廠建設史中近乎奇跡。 　　 康思遠坦言，在沈陽的新工廠將于2012年投入使用。隨著市場的迅猛發展，將比原計劃的規模更大，設備更先進。 　　 中國市場目前已經是寶馬全球第三大市場，今年4月份，寶馬集團在中國市場共計售出了2.08萬輛汽車，同比增幅為67.2%，銷量占寶馬全球銷量的15%。--->if 1114.HK accounted for 40% of the total sales, that will contribute to 8% of the annual target of 1114.HK for 2011. 　　 雖然已經深挖產能潛力，但華晨寶馬的產能瓶頸依舊存在，為了緩解在中國市場供不應求的現狀，去年華晨寶馬一度採用了引進進口車的市場策略填補市場上對於熱門車型的需求。 　　 在中國追加投資是一筆劃算的買賣，因為現在的中國市場已經成為寶馬集團的“現金奶牛”。上周末，寶馬集團發佈了今年一季度的財報，其中寶馬集團的淨利潤達到了12億歐元（約合17.8億美元），相比于2010年同期的3.23億歐元增長了近三倍。盈利大幅度增長的主要原因便是中國和美國豪華車市場需求高漲所致。 　　 而從全球豪華車巨頭在中國的戰略布局來看，由於市場需求旺盛，奧迪、奔馳也同樣受到產能瓶頸的束縛。此前，奧迪、奔馳已相繼宣佈了在華擴大產能的計劃，目標均為30萬輛年產能。 　　 從今年前4個月的銷量來看，排在該細分市場前三位的分別是奧迪、寶馬、奔馳，其中，寶馬、奔馳與奧迪的距離正在逐步縮短。此次，寶馬率先拉高了投資計劃，或將對未來中國豪華車市場的競爭格局產生實質性影響。

4月宝马全球销量增18% 中国激增67%

2011年05月10日

盖世汽车讯 德国宝马汽车集团日前宣布，该公司2011年4月份在全球范围内几乎所有市场的汽车销量均有不同程度的提升，整体销量同比提高了17.9%，达到了13.72万辆，该数据中包含宝马集团旗下宝马、MINI和劳斯莱斯三个汽车品牌的销量。

据统计，2011年前四个月，宝马集团全球汽车销量累计达到了51.99万辆，同比增幅高达20.4%。宝马集团负责销售和市场营销的董事伊恩·罗 伯森（Ian Robertson）表示：“4月份，我们在德国、美国和中国这三个最主要的市场维持了良好表现，并且在巴西、俄罗斯、印度、韩国和土耳其等市场中进展顺 利。”

宝马集团2011年4月份在中国市场共计售出了2.08万辆汽车，同比增幅为67.2%，销量占宝马全球销量的15%。4月份美国市场占宝马全球份额的18.4%，该市场宝马汽车销量同比增长了18%。

数据显示，2011年4月份，宝马品牌汽车销量同比增长了14.8%，至11.31万辆。宝马新款X3销量达到了9902辆，相比于2010年提高了140%。此外，紧凑型宝马X1销量为10846辆。

2011年4月份，MINI品牌汽车销量达到了2.38万辆，同比增幅高达34.5%，其中在中国市场的增幅为89.2%，韩国增幅为130.8%，俄罗斯增幅为283.7%。

特步攻時尚體育 力拓二、三市場

特步攻時尚體育 力拓二、三市場 內地體育用品行業競爭步向白熱化，主力於一城市發展的體育用品品牌陷入增長放緩的困境，反觀主攻二、三城市的特步國際（01368），於去年原材料價格大升的情況下，毛利率仍增1.5個百分點至40.6%，今年首三季訂貨會的定單金額各錄得逾20%增長。公司主席丁水波接受本刊專訪時說，不認為內地體育用品行業出現增長放緩，他相信整個行業仍有15%增長空間，而特步的增長更會大於行業平均水平。 曾幾何時，內地體育用品挾「高增長內需概念」，曾在2009年紅極一時，成市場熱炒對象。但隨愈來愈多海外及內地品牌加入戰場，內地體育用品行業競爭漸趨激烈，當中本土體育品牌「大阿哥」李寧（02331）去年12月底公布，旗下李寧牌2011年第二季定單出現倒退，隨即響起市場對體育用品行業增長放緩的憂慮。 增長關鍵取決成本利潤 事實上，券商高盛早於去年10月已發表研究報告，指內地體育用品行業將出現增長放緩，預計整體行業2009年至2011年的預測每股盈利複合增長率將放緩至15%，並認為未來行業增長的關鍵，將取決於銷售成本及利潤率水平，當時高盛較看好具同店銷售增長前景的股份，特步就是其中之一。 據內地體育用品股早前公布的2010年全年業績數據顯示，主攻二、三城市的體育品牌錄得相當不錯的成績，其中特步去年全年盈利升26%至8.14億元，較市場預期為高；反觀主力拓展一城市的品牌業績明顯遜色。談及特步去年業績，丁水波坦言對公司表現十分滿意，「2010年行業面對材料漲價，員工工資上調的問題，同時部分品牌做得不好的前提下，特步能夠有這樣的增長，這是非常好的。」 內地體育用品行業面對激烈競爭，就連本土龍頭品牌李寧也告別高增長期，該公司更揚言未來兩年將是行業變革過程中的陣痛期，令市場對體育用品的前景並不樂觀。丁水波卻不認同行業已步入增長放緩期，「業務出現增長放緩，只是個別企業的情況，並不代表整個行業有問題；個別企業要關店，也只是他們自身的問題。而特步的業務以二、三城市為主，公司業績仍在增長，毛利率仍在改善，我們還有很多店需要開，發展前景非常好。」 行業仍有15%增長空間 對於部分體育品牌業務出現增長放緩，丁水波解釋是由於上述品牌的定位出現問題，換言之，這些品牌處於高不及國際品牌，但低不致落到內地品牌的水平，沒有體現核心優勢。另一個原因，就是企業的經營重心出現調整。「事實上，我們這行業的競爭並非太激烈，賣鞋子、衣服這些都是日用品，我認為這行業平均水平仍有15%的增長空間，國家有這麼多的優惠政策，令這行業的發展空間較大，而特步的增長應該會大於行業平均水平，我們今年仍有打算開設800至1,000家零售店。」 丁水波表示，中國「十二．五」規劃於今年開局，政府擴大內需政策下，全國人民的工資在上漲，特別是中低收入人士的工資增加，將會刺激消費，而特步的業務主要集中於二、三地區，剛好受惠於此。他說特步另一個優勢，就是公司定位在時尚運動上，「現在時尚運動就是市場最為接受的，因為人們買衣服未必要買最傳統，反而期望有獨特的地方，我們正好迎合這潮流；現在中國人也講求運動生活化，日常生活也可以穿運動服，你看我們的服裝增長非常好，就是由於品牌定位具優勢。」 提前買入原材料減成本 不過，隨內地一城市市場步向飽和，二、三市場漸成為兵家必爭之地，近年國際品牌也積極加入這個戰團，像Adidas中國的2015年戰略中，計劃於內地中小城市開設2,500家店舖，意味二、三市場的競爭將加劇，對此丁水波卻毫不擔心，「實際上，Nike及Adidas已進入二、三城市5至6年，他們一直都說要進入這市場，但我認為對特步沒有造成影響，我們在這些地區經營了多年，人力、資源、渠道較好，也有價格上的優勢，我們與分銷商建立良好的關係，給予他們的折扣較多，讓他們有較大的賺錢空間。」他補充，國際品牌在價格上是沒有優勢的，「他們在一城市已有中高層的消費客群，假如Nike的價錢由近700元跌至200元的話，人們可能不穿了！」 近年內地通脹升溫，原材料價格大幅上漲，是不少企業面對的難題，特步將如何應對？丁水波說，公司將採取提前購買原材料的策略，「我們早在半年前就購買原材料，我們用現金提前買入原材料，這有效鎖定原材料的價格，成本得到控制下，就有助提升毛利率水平。」 ﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏﹏ 原材料價格上漲增風險 自去年底以來，內地體育用品股股價可謂「彈不起」，今年初至今多隻體育用品股股價跑輸大市，其中李寧及中國動向（03818）的股價自年初至今分別跌約19%，至於中國特步股價也跌約2%，跑輸大市。 新鴻基金融集團分析員蘇沛豐表示，李寧、中國動向股價表現較差，是由於她們面對國際品牌的競爭，無論是去年的同店銷售，及今年的定單也有倒退，他相信上述公司的股價弱勢會持續。 另邊廂，他認為主力於二、三城市發展的體育用品股表現會相對較好，仍有增長空間，「他們未受到國際品牌的威脅，同時估值相對較低，相信投資者會偏好較低檔的品牌。」不過，蘇沛豐亦提出了主力於二、三城市發展的體育用品股存在的風險，「我未看到有特別因素可推動上述公司的估值向上，仍未有『rerating』的概念出現，雖然她們仍有增長，但投資者憂慮體育用品品牌的競爭會愈來愈大，同時她們也面對巨大成本壓力，如工資、原材料成本大升，這些因素在去年的業績可能未完全反映，我相信今年的業績將反映她們的壓力。」 把握時機 迎合國策 丁水波今年才41歲，他早於17歲時已開展其創業之路，於1987年以1,500元人民幣開辦鞋廠，公司經過20多年的發展，至今已成為市值達116億元的上市公司。談及他的成功之路，丁水波表示全賴他成功把握時機，將業務迎合國策發展。 他憶述指，自己在八十年代創辦鞋廠，其後國家在九十年代提倡要將中國成為世界工場，將中國的貨品賣到全世界，於是他在1990年轉戰OEM業務，將產品出口到全世界，自此公司業績每年翻一番，錄得高速增長。及至2000年以後，國家提倡要擴大內需，拉動經濟，丁水波就於2000年毅然創立「特步」這自家品牌，拓展內地品牌。 「到了21世紀，國家提倡企業要做國際品牌、擴大網絡銷售，要進入資本市場、搞上市，令企業發展得更快，我們就成為上市公司，走進國際市場，因此你必需要跟據這些步伐來走，你的企業就可以發展起來。」丁水波指，今年是中國的第十二個5年計劃，同樣今年剛好是特步的第三個5年計劃開始，中國的「十二．五」規劃要求要擴大內需，加大城鄉建設，而特步的5年計劃就是根據中國擴內需的大方向去做。 與迪士尼合作進軍國際 丁水波表示，國際化是特步的主要目標，公司會以一步一步的方式走向國際。特步走向國際的其中一步，就是與迪士尼合作，她早於2006年起擁有迪士尼運動系列商標及部分迪士尼人物使權，授權在內地使用及銷售「迪士尼運動」系列產品。上述合約將於明年到期，丁水波指雙方關係非常好，有信心可以續約。 特步走向國際的第二步，就是成為英超球隊伯明翰的贊助商，她在去年宣布與英超球隊伯明翰簽訂為期5年的贊助協議，成為該球隊服裝贊助商，是首家亮相英超賽事的內地運動品牌。而伯明翰早前剛取得英格蘭聯賽盃冠軍，有助特步在國際間打響名堂。 丁水波強調，以往中國產品給人的印象是質量不好的，隨中國近幾年強大，品質及管理上改善了，希望未來中國的產品可為國際接受。他表示，目前海外有100多個特步產品銷售點，為令公司成為全球化品牌的公司，公司冀將海外銷售點進一步增加，現在正力爭進入歐洲市場。 I quite like domestic demand. 1368.HK is good positioned. Go.

寶馬第一季度淨利潤增長近三倍至18億美元

蓋世汽車訊 德國豪車製造商寶馬集團日前公佈了2011年首季度盈利資料，2011年第一季度寶馬集團的淨利潤達到了12億歐元（約合17.8億美元），相比於2010年同期的3.23億歐元增長了近三倍。 資料顯示，2011年第一季度，寶馬集團的息稅前利潤（EBIT）達到了19億歐元（28億美元），而去年同期爲4.49億歐元。2011年第一季度，寶馬集團的營業收入達到了160.4億歐元，同比增長了29%。 寶馬汽車公司表示，該公司2011年全年的汽車銷量將超過150萬輛，全年盈利將超出2010年。寶馬公司2010年實現淨利潤32.3億歐元（折合45億美元），爲該公司年利潤的最高紀錄。 2011年第一季度，寶馬公司全球汽車銷量累計達到了38.3萬輛，1、2、3月份銷量分別爲10.5萬、11.2萬輛和16.6萬。其中，3月份寶馬汽車全球銷量同比增幅高達17%。據瞭解，寶馬汽車公司盈利大幅度增長主要由中國和美國豪車市場需求高漲所致。 Keep checking 1114.HK.

匹克勝在夠「專」恐慌過後領風騷

匹克勝在夠「專」恐慌過後領風騷 「筆者相信，隨業績公布，市場再意識到業績差勁可能只是小撮公司的策略錯誤後，匹克（1968）的強勁增長又會再次在股價上反映出來。」人說所謂投資之道，不外乎人棄我取，低買高賣。今年2 月，就在國內運動服裝業一片風聲鶴唳之際，筆者曾在文章中介紹了匹克體育。記得那時候在各間大行研究報告的「四面楚歌」之下，連牛頭角順嫂都可以對看淡這板塊的原因如數家珍：估值過高、增長減慢、競爭加劇、租金上升、不能再單靠增加開店數量來維持擴張……。 研發經費長期偏低 但與此同時，匹克卻交出了亮麗的2010 年成績表。匹克體育的股價， 由2011 年2 月文章見街時的5.19 元，上升至上星期收市的5.92元；4 月27 日的高位更達6.21 元，前後升幅幾達20% 。就在升幅之後，牛頭角順嫂又差不多遺忘以上那堆因素過後，我們該如何再看匹克？ 匹克2010 年營業收入增長37%，至42.49 億元人民幣，盈利增長30.9%，至8.22 億元人民幣。可謂皆大歡喜，合乎預期上限。匹克體育2011 年第四季訂貨會訂單金額按年上升近21.1% （2011 第一、第二、第三季訂貨會訂單金額按年增幅分別為25%、24%及24%）。 估值方面， 以上星期收市價5.92 港元，和高盛高華在2011 年3月預期的2011 全年純利9.54 億元人民幣計算，2011 年O約為11 倍，年增長為18%，PEG 約為0.6。 筆者2 月時已然提到，投資者如果相信匹克體育走的是專業路線的話，就務必要跟進集團在產品研發上的發展。據集團2010 的年報顯示，匹克體育在2010 年用在產品研究的經費依然維持於總銷售額的0.5%（2009 年為0.3%），比照國內同業的2%至3%依然偏低。 請留意國內龍頭如李寧（2331）和中國動向（3818）2010年的有關比率為2.58%和3.33%，就是特步（1368）也有1.7%，連原本2009 年只有0.43% 的361 度（1361）在2010 年亦已將有關比率大增至2.0%！ 可能你會留意到，外國大牌子如adidas，在2010 和2009 年的有關比率也僅為0.8%，不過大家亦會想到，兩個集團在發展階段和規模完全不一樣（adidas 2010 年那0.8% 的產品研發經費已足足為1 億歐羅）。 除較早前於美國洛杉磯開設的研究中心外，集團於年報中亦提到擴大了原有於北京和廣州的兩個研發中心。2009 年，匹克的研究和設計人員分布在北京、廣州、泉州及惠安；至2010 年，研究和設計已經集中在北京、廣州、泉州及洛杉磯的研究中心，人員卻減至200 人。 筆者手上沒有更詳細資料，未知以上的現象是暫時的人員整合調動，還是有更深遠的原因。 一如所言，匹克的「專」，令它比起其他品牌更容易保持品牌優勢。長期偏低的產品研發經費，減少了的研發人手，筆者期望這只是短期的現場，更期望管理層在這方面對投資者有更詳細的交代。 估值雖然合理，但在這個充滿競爭的國內運動服裝業，只要有任何「風吹草動」，難保類似今年2 月的調整不會再出現！筆者依然相信匹克為國內運動服裝業中的首選，但請留意，之前的恐慌已過，與其投資在一個競爭白熱化的板塊，何不考慮其他可能更有利可圖的行業，如上幾個星期提到的中國建築（3311）或天倫燃氣（1600）？ 攻陷二三線城市 再寫匹克前，筆者上網搜尋了一下有關2 月1 日「匹克」一文的相關的條目。 一搜之下大有發現。原來竟然另有一篇2 月10 日有關匹克的文章，一字不漏連標點符號也一模一樣的提到匹克「接近7000 間門市中近75%都設在三線城市，一線城市門市的比率只有5%」；另外又一模一樣的提到匹克「早已紮根二三線城市」。 筆者2 月1 日文中提到匹克是，「……國內唯一一家與美國NBA 建立夥伴關係的體育品牌公司。匹克於之前20 年，都是以籃球為主題，透過簽約15 名NBA 球員和贊助國內籃球賽事提高知名度。」該篇鴻文當然亦有類似陳述，「因為集團早於20 年前，已採用籃球為主題，現時是內地唯一一家與美國NBA 建立夥伴關係的體育品牌公司，透過簽約15 個NBA 球員和贊助內地籃球賽事提高知名度。」（好奇的讀者如想瀏覽該篇鴻文，可以在Google 打入「門市的比率」這字詞搜尋一下，第一個搜尋結果為筆者的文章；第二個搜尋結果就是此篇文章）。 筆者從未以其他筆名一稿兩投，對有其他作者能在筆者文章見街9 日之後猶如心靈感應寫出如此東西只能嘖嘖稱奇。 遇到這些情況，筆者總會想起一句英諺， 「Imitation/plagiarism is the sincerest form of flattery」（最衷心真誠的奉承方式就是仿冒╱抄襲）。 上星期提到有些讀者在網上留言覺得筆者是明燈，寫的文章根本是放屁；不過，筆者看罷以上鴻文後，非常安慰。還好，看來還有些人很衷心、很真誠的覺得，筆者放的屁，還蠻香的呢！ 上哲 From 香港信報, 2011年5月3日 I think the perspective of Sports sector will continue to benefit from the rising income of mainlanders. A good sector to enjoy the policy of Boost Inner Demand.

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